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LETTING BAYOUS BE BYGONES: SHOULD LOUISIANA
BE ALLOWED TO MANDATE USE OF THE
PRE-SOCIALIST VIETNAM FLAG?
Nami Kimt
Abstract: The State of Louisiana recently enacted S.B. 839, a state law that
mandates the use of the flag of the former Democratic Republic of Vietnam at all state-
sponsored public functions and public schools where Vietnam is to be represented. S.B.
839 has added further tension to the relationship between Vietnam and the United States,
which is already strained by the unresolved issue of American prisoners of war
("POWs"), those missing in action ("MIA") in Vietnam, and the recent opening of
Vietnam's economy to the rest of the world. Although fifty-nine cities and three other
states in the United States have passed resolutions similar to the law in Louisiana, S.B.
839 remains the only state legislation that retains vigorous anti-Communist language and
forbids the flying of the actual Socialist flag.
S.B. 839 is a form of unprotected government speech that intrudes on the federal
government's exclusive power to handle foreign affairs in violation of the Dormant
Foreign Affairs Power ("DFAP") doctrine. Established by the Supreme Court in
Zschernig v. Miller, this doctrine has never been overruled.
The Supreme Court has never directly spoken to the specific issue of flags as
implements of foreign policy. Lower courts have limited their use of the DFAP doctrine
to arguably more material issues, such as selective taxation or the denial of higher
education to certain foreign students. Yet S.B. 839 touches upon the main concerns
behind the DFAP doctrine: unwanted disturbance of the relationship between the United
States and a foreign country, and encouragement of similar action by other states and
cities. Because S.B. 839 poses a challenge to the traditional isolation of states from
foreign affairs, the Vietnamese-American community should propose a version of S.B.
839 in the United States Congress if they wish to address their underlying concerns.
1. INTRODUCTION
On July 12, 2003, the Louisiana State Legislature enacted S.B. 839,
a resolution authored by State Senators Jon Johnson, Robert J. Barham, and
J. Chris Ullo on behalf of their numerous Vietnamese constituents. The text
of the enactment states:
The legislature does hereby recognize that the people of the
former Republic of Vietnam, also known as South Vietnam,
were valiant in their resistance to the aggression of the
communist North Vietnam. The legislature further finds that
The author would like to thank John Pierce of Stoel Rives, LLC; Professor Veronica Taylor;
Amalia R. Walton; Elizabeth A. Tutmarc; and Hannah Saona for their editing assistance and guidance.
Codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:153.3 (2004) [hereinafter S.B. 839]. For purposes of this
Comment, I will refer to the resolution by its bill number to accommodate the majority of sources that
continue to refer to it as such.
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refugees from the former Republic of Vietnam who emigrated
to the United States of America and settled in the state of
Louisiana should be honored and remembered for their
sacrifices. Therefore, the only flag depicting the country of
Vietnam that may be displayed in any state-sponsored public
function or any public institution of learning shall be the flag of
the former Republic of Vietnam.
2
The passage of S.B. 839 marks the latest in a series of challenges to
the federal government's exclusive control of foreign relations, also known
as the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power ("DFAP"). At present, it is the
twelfth of sixty-three such pronouncements denouncing the flag of
Communist Vietnam, and the first successful state bill. S.B. 839 is also the
only state bill that retains such vigorous anti-Communist language and
forbids the use of the actual Socialist flag. At first blush, S.B. 839 may
present an obvious legal question as to whether states can intrude on the
federal foreign relations power. However, because the Supreme Court has
never directly addressed the concept of symbols as actual implements of
foreign policy, the question becomes more of a political issue rather than a
legal or constitutional query.4 The Louisiana resolution represents a
2 Id.
3 FREE VIETNAM ALLIANCE, VIETNAMESE AMERICAN FREEDOM AND HERITAGE FLAG, at
http://www.fva.org/vnflag/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Roster]. The following represents the
most up-to-date list of cities/states that have adopted flag legislation. The list is in reverse chronological
order and includes the name of the city/state and the date of the legislation's passage: Missouri, TX (Sep.
7, 2004); Sugar Land, TX (Aug. 24, 2004); Portland, OR (June 28, 2004); Carollton, TX (June 15, 2004);
Coral Springs, FL (June 15, 2004); Vancouver, WA (June 7, 2004); Seaside, CA (June 3, 2004);
Lakewood, CO (May 24, 2004); Tampa Bay, FL (May 13, 2004); Bonney Lake City, UT (May 4, 2004);
State of Colorado (Apr. 30, 2004); Saint Louis, MO (Apr. 30, 2004); Tacoma, WA (Apr. 20, 2004); Kent,
WA (Apr. 20, 2004); Minneapolis, MN (Apr. 16, 2004); Commonwealth, VA (Apr. 15, 2004); Syracuse,
NY (Apr. 12, 2004); State of Georgia (Apr. 1, 04); Honolulu, HI (Mar. 24, 2004); Centralia, WA (Mar. 24,
2004); Orlando, Florida (Mar. 22, 2004); Biloxi, MS (Mar. 16, 2004); Stockton, CA (Feb. 17, 2004); South
El Monte, CA (Feb. 10, 2004); Grand Prairie, TX (Feb. 2, 2004); Philadelphia, PA (Jan. 29, 2004); Pierce
County, WA (Jan. 26, 2004); San Diego, CA (Jan. 13, 2004); Wichita, KS (Jan. 13, 2004); Du Pont, WA
(Jan. 13, 2004); Wichita, KS (Jan. 13, 2004); Lincoln, NE (Jan. 10, 2004); Worcester, WA (Dec. 16, 2003);
Lakewood, WA (Dec. 8, 2003); Puyallup, WA (Dec. 1, 2003); Olympia, WA (Nov. 22, 2003); Marina City,
CA (Nov. 18, 2003); Arlington, TX (Nov. 11, 2003); Clarkston, GA (Nov. 3 2003); Norcross, GA (Nov. 3,
2003); Doraville, GA (Oct. 20, 2003); Quincy, MA (Oct. 7, 2003); Grand Rapids, MI (Sept. 30, 2003);
Garland, TX (Sept. 16, 2003); Tumwater, WA (Sept. 16, 2003); El Monte, CA (Sept. 16, 2003); Malden,
MA (Sept. 16, 2003); Springfield, MA (Sept. 8, 2003); Sacramento, CA (Aug. 27, 2003); Rowley, MA
(Sept. 15, 2003); Boston, MA (July 30, 2003); Fairfax County, VA (July 7, 2003); Pomona, CA (July 7,
2003); Houston, TX (June 18, 2003); Holland, MI (June 4, 2003); Santa Clara County, CA (June 3, 2003);
Saint Paul, MN (May 28, 2003); Milpitas, CA (May 6, 2003); San Jose, CA (Apr. 15, 2003); Falls Church,
VA (Apr. 14, 2003); Garden Grove, CA (March 11, 2003); Westminster, CA (Feb. 12, 2003).
4 See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty
Power, 49 DuKE L.J. 1127, 1143 (2000) (describing the theory of state preclusion from foreign affairs post-
Zschernig as "notoriously unclear").
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narrowly focused wave of anti-Communist sentiment sweeping through city
councils and state legislatures. 5 The true indictment against S.B. 839,
therefore, is its inherent political purpose.
This Comment explores why the Louisiana flag conflict is properly
understood as a violation of the DFAP doctrine. Part II lays the historical
background on the tense U.S.-Vietnam relationship. Part III introduces the
DFAP doctrine, setting up the doctrinal framework for examining the central
issues of federalism and foreign policy presented by the Louisiana flag issue.
Part IV discusses the status of S.B. 839 as both product and provocateur of
the many other legislative pronouncements targeting the Communist
Vietnamese flag. Part V delineates the major concerns implicated and
possibly threatened by the flag resolutions: the still-unresolved POW/MIA
issue; 6 the loss of leverage in the human rights campaign; 7 and the impact
on trade relations,8 particularly with respect to the Vietnamese catfish
debacle. 9 Part VI examines the language and legislative history of S.B. 839
to demonstrate its intent to influence foreign relations. Part VII considers
the relevance of symbolic actions within the framework of the DFAP
doctrine. It concludes that flags, as communicative symbols, are forms of
government speech that do not fall under the protection of the First
Amendment and that S.B. 839 therefore violates the DFAP doctrine.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES IS
Too FRAGILE TO WITHSTAND ADDITIONAL INFLAMMATION
The history of the relationship between the United States and Vietnam
reveals a past fraught with mistrust and conflict. Although the federal
government currently conducts diplomatic relations with Vietnam and has
done so since 1995, the formal resumption of normalized relations came
only after a twenty-year chill between the two countries.' 0 This delicate
relationship began only after arduous negotiations over Vietnam's human
5 See Roster, supra note 3.
6 See Peter G. Furniss, Recent Development: The United States-Vietnam Trade Relationship:
Politics and Law in the Process of Normalization, 35 HARVARD INT'L L.J. 238, 240 (1994); John A. Farrell
& Michael Kranish, Clinton Lifts Trade Barriers on Vietnam, Cites cooperation, POW-MIA Groups Decry
Decision, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14, 1994, at 1.
7 See Furniss, supra note 6.
' See id.
9 See generally Amalia R. Walton, Comment, Catfish Wars: Vietnam's Fight for Free Trade in the
U.S. Court ofInternational Trade, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL!Y J. 471 (2004).
'0 BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND
NOTE: VIETNAM, Sept. 2004, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4130.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2005).
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rights policies,1" its return of American POW/MIA servicemen,' 2 and its
entry into the capitalist market.' 3 As aptly stated by Vietnam's top Party
leader, Le Kha Phieu, however, the war between the two countries
sometimes appears to have simply switched to less bloody battlefields: "The
U.S. continue[s] to seek ways to completely wipe out the remaining socialist
countries ... We should never relax our vigilance for a minute."' 14  The
forceful message of S.B. 839 could contribute to the destabilization of a
historically volatile relationship between the Unites States and Vietnam, a
consequence forbidden by the DFAP doctrine.' 5
A. Tension Between the United States and Vietnam Has Remained High
Since the Vietnam War
The years following the 1973 Paris Accords' 6 saw a complex interplay
of trade policies, human rights issues, and POW/MIA negotiations that
ultimately became the trademark of relations between Vietnam and the
United States. Vietnam was left in stark isolation after the United States
severed trade relations in 1975.'7 Many countries and world financial
organizations followed America's lead, fearing similar treatment by the
United States.' 8 In 1976, President Ford first refused Vietnam's demands
for humanitarian aid in direct violation of the Paris Accords 19 until Vietnam
fulfilled its own pledge to return the remains of American POWs and
MIAs.20  In 1978, Vietnam invaded neighboring Cambodia. 2 1 The Carter
1 Ky Tran-Trong, Note, A Would-Be Tiger: Assessing Vietnam's Prospects For Gaining Most
Favored Nation Status From The United States, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1583, 1591-93 (1997).
I2 See id.
'3 See id.
14 Lan Cao, Eighteenth Annual International Law Symposium: Doing Business in Vietnam:
Reflections on Market Reform in Post-War, Post-Embargo Vietnam, 22 WHIrTIER L. REv. 1029, 1048
(2001).
15 Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968) (condemning those state actions that "impair the
effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy").
16 Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, January 27, 1973, U.S.-Vietnam, 24 U.S.T. I
[hereinafter Paris Accords]. The Paris Accords are the informal name for the treaty between the United
States and Vietnam which ended the Vietnam War.
17 See Furniss, supra note 6, at 238 n.l.
1 See id. at 238-39 (explaining that the United States effectively shut off any chance for Vietnam's
economic independence when it pressured the World Bank to withdraw $60 million dollars in low-interest
loans).
Paris Accords, supra note 16, art. 21.
20 See Ky Tran-Trong, supra note 11, at 1586.
2I See Fumiss, supra note 6, at 238.
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Administration responded by officially ending diplomatic ties with
Vietnam.
22
In an attempt to balance the United States' changing economic and
political needs, George Bush Sr.'s administration initiated a four-step plan
for reconciliation in 1991.23 The United States' relative position of power
over Vietnam had changed somewhat: in 1986, after a decade of financial
turmoil, Vietnam had initiated a new economic policy called doi moi, or
"renovation," allowing private and foreign investment within its borders for
the first time and initiating a process of business-friendly legal reform.24
Without the fear of expropriation of assets, other countries responded with
fervor and began to invest in Vietnam. 25 This international reprieve not only
crippled the United States' embargo strategy, but also threatened American
businesses as they continued to lose out on a burgeoning Vietnamese
market. 26 The four-step plan therefore emphasized a careful quid pro quo
approach of humanitarian aid and graduated economic relations in exchange
for resolution of the POW/MIA issues and a market-style economy. 27 With
considerable protest from human rights' groups and Vietnam War veterans,
President Clinton lifted the U.S. embargo on Vietnam on February 4, 1994.28
By 1996, the United States had become Vietnam's sixth largest foreign
investor, with more than $1.2 billion in investments.29 However, the issues
of trade, human rights, and the POW/MIA situation remain unresolved and
are threatened by the symbolic affront posed by measures such as S.B. 839.
B. Broken Promises Regarding the POW/MIA Situation Continue to Add
Tension to the U.S.-Vietnam Relationship
The POW/MIA issue has historically been both lynchpin and leverage
in the ongoing tug-of-war in U.S.-Vietnam relations. 30  U.S. veterans'
groups responded furiously to the lifting of the embargo in 1994, claiming
that Vietnam had only succeeded in providing more deceit and double-talk
22 See David Mowry, Note, Lifting the Embargo Against Cuba Using Vietnam as a Model: A Policy
Paperfor Modernity, 25 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 229, 247 (1999).
See Ky Tran-Trong, supra note 11, at 1591.
24 See Lan Cao, supra note 14, at 1039-40.
Protection of Foreign Direct Investment in a New World Order: Vietnam - A Case Study, 107
HARV. L. REv. 1995, 1996 n.15 (1994) ("Vietnam's international trade quintupled between 1989 and
1992... exports surged at an average annual rate of 30 percent from 1988 to 1992 . . .and foreign
investment quadrupled between 1988 and 1993.") (citations omitted)).
26 See Furniss, supra note 6, at 241.
27 See Ky Tran-Trong, supra note 11, at 1591-93.
25 See id. at 1593.
29 See id. at 1592-93.
30 See Furniss, supra note 6, at 240.
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on the POW/MIA issue.3' In 1996, when trade relations resumed, the U.S.
government's official figure for POWs/MIAs in Vietnam was 2238, many of
whom were known to be dead.32 Attempting to assuage angry war veterans,
President Clinton "took pains" to convey that economic considerations
"played no role in the decision" to open up Vietnam's borders, citing
Vietnam's "significant tangible progress" on POW/MIA issue as his main
impetus. 33 However, as of 2001, the United States estimated the number of
servicemen still unaccounted for at 1948. 34 This lack of resolution has
complicated the United States' embrace of Vietnam as both a trading partner
and a true ally.
C. The Economic Relationship Between the United States and Vietnam is
Already at Risk Even Without the Added Political Insult of Legislation
Such as S.B. 839
Although the last decade has seen historic leaps in the ongoing
economic reconciliation between the United States and Vietnam, the
relationship itself is still quite delicate. On July 13, 2000, after five years of
negotiation, the United States and Vietnam signed a Bilateral Trade
Agreement ("BTA"), which Congress approved a year later.35  The
agreement allows Vietnamese and American firms to import and export
freely within Vietnam, lowers tariffs on American goods, adopts World
Trade Organization ("WTO") standards for intellectual property rights and
customs-related matters; permits full market access for services; and
establishes investment and transparency provisions to promote a market-
style economy.
36
The trade relationship stumbled almost immediately, however, with
claims of thinly veiled protectionist economics by Vietnam and accusations
of dumping and cutthroat pricing by the United States.37 This animosity
manifested itself principally in the Vietnamese catfish debacle, which
resulted in the imposition of large tariffs on Vietnamese catfish and a later
31 See Farrell & Kranish, supra note 6, at 1.
32 Ruth Marcus & Thomas W. Lippman, Clinton Lifts Vietnam Trade Embargo; President Calls It
'the Best Way' to Ensure Progress on MIA Issue, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1994, at Al.
33 See Marcus & Lippman, supra note 32, at Al.
31 See ROBERT L. GOLDICH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, POWS AND MIAS: STATUS AND
ACCOUNTING ISSUES 4, at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/IB9210l.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2005).
35 MARK E. MANYIN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE VIETNAM-U.S. NORMALIZATION
PROCESS 4 (2003), at http://vietnam.usembassy.gov/wwwfta98e.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2005).
36 Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 94
AM. J. INT'L L. 677, 701 (2000).
37 See Walton, supra note 9.
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ruling that forbade the labeling of these fish as "catfish., 38  By visibly
snubbing the government of Socialist Vietnam, S.B. 839 risks inflaming that
country to the point of legitimizing Vietnamese complaints of political
blackmail.
D. The United States Continues to Allege Human Rights Violations in
Vietnam
The issues of human and religious rights have emerged as more recent
points of contention between the United States and Vietnam. Over the past
two years, the U.S. House of Representatives has passed several bills
attacking Vietnam's restrictive polices regarding freedom of information,
39
human rights,40 and religious freedom.4' Vietnam has also been subject to
general public condemnation of its policies by the United States.42 Vietnam
has complained bitterly about this interference with its internal affairs,43 and
it may prove difficult for the United States to continue the encouragement of
democratic ideals while visibly tolerating insurgent state action such as S.B.
839.
III. A STATE'S IMPACT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS INDICATES A VIOLATION
OF THE DFAP DOCTRINE
The United States federal government has historically dominated the
realm of foreign affairs, with courts allowing it to establish near-exclusive
control over international relations.44 Over the years, courts have developed
38 See id. Recent controversy involving the marketing and selling of Vietnamese catfish in the
United States has made Mississippi, Arkansas, Alabama, and Louisiana the locus of heated debate over
protectionist economics and state compliance with the BTA. As one of the four main catfish-farming
states in the United States, Louisiana benefits considerably from the current laws outlawing the marketing
of Vietnamese catfish as "catfish."
'9 Freedom of Information in Vietnam Act, H.R. 1019, 108th Cong. (2003).
40 Vietnam Human Rights Act, H.R. 1587, 108th Cong. (2003).
41 HR. Res. 427, 108th Cong. (2003). The U.S. Senate has also passed similar resolutions regarding
religious freedom in Vietnam. See S. Res. 343, 108th Cong. (2004).
42 See, e.g., Jared Genser, The Real Scandal About Vietnam, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2004, at A17
(calling on the Bush Administration to "to insist on improved respect for human rights in Vietnam");
Andrew J. Pierre, Vietnam's Contradictions, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Dec. 2000, at 69 (describing a
"Vietnamese human rights record that has been a point of contention with the United States for many
years").
43 Vietnam Radio Hails US Visit by Deputy Premier Nguyen Tan Dung, BBC MONITORING
INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Dec. 18, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, All News File.
44 See, e.g., U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) ("Governmental power over external affairs
is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government"); U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233
(1942) ("No State can rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power over
external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively").
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and advanced a far-reaching DFAP doctrine, which forbids states from
taking actions that impact foreign relations.45 S.B. 839 directly violates this
doctrine by establishing a policy that refuses to recognize the current
socialist government of Vietnam.
A. Zschernig Laid a Broad Blanket of Power Regarding the Federal
Government's Exclusive Control of Foreign Policy
In Zschernig v. Miller,46 the Supreme Court of the United States
declared that the realm of foreign affairs belonged exclusively to the federal
government and thus prohibited any intrusive state action in that domain,
regardless of whether any countervailing federal statute actually existed 7
The state statute at issue in Zschernig prohibited nonresident foreign aliens
from inheriting property located in the state of Oregon, absent a showing of:(1) reciprocal terms of inheritance that allowed American residents to take
similar possession in that country; and (2) some sort of assurance that the
foreign government in question could not confiscate the property.48 In its
decision, the Court advanced a broad prohibition on laws that required "the
kind of state involvement in foreign affairs and international
relations... which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal
Government. ' 49 Such a broad prohibition, however, did not exist literally in
the Constitution.5" The Court nevertheless declared that even traditionally
state-dominated areas of regulation "must give way if they impair the
effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy." 5' It apparently considered
the DFAP doctrine so fundamental to effective government that it rendered
irrelevant the federal government's acquiescence in the face of the Oregon
52
act . Zschernig remains the principal source of the DFAP doctrine; the
Supreme Court has never overruled it, nor addressed the matter since. 3
45 See generally Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
46 id.
47 Id. at 441 (stating that "even in absence of a treaty, a State's policy may disturb foreign
relations").41 Id. at 430 n. 1.
49 Id. at 436.
so This question is hotly debated. Many scholars concede that the text of the Constitution itself does
not expressly refer to a general foreign affairs power. See, e.g., Carol E. Head, Note, The Dormant Foreign
Affairs Power: Constitutional Implications for State and Local Investment Restrictions Impacting Foreign
Countries, 42 B.C. L. REV. 123, 136 n.75 (2000) (arguing that "the Court has not explicitly delineated the
roots of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power"); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts Foreign Affairs, and
Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1641-42 (1997) (arguing that the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power is a
federal common law doctrine not actually found in the text of the Constitution).
st Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440.
52 Id. at 434. In spite of the Department of Justice's concession in Zschernig that it did "not ...
contend that the application of the Oregon escheat statute in the circumstances of this case unduly interferes
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B. The Zschemig Court Was Primarily Concerned with Negative Impacts
on Foreign Relations with Other Countries
The Court took a dramatic step by making foreign affairs a per se
state-free zone in Zschernig.54 Justice Douglas underscored the threat of
reduced leverage with and possible retaliation by any offended foreign
nations as a primary motivation of the DFAP doctrine. 55 Because Oregon's
reciprocity statute had "more than some incidental or indirect effect in
foreign countries," wrote Justice Douglas, "its great potential for disruption
or embarrassment makes us hesitate to place it in the category of a
diplomatic bagatelle. 6 The Oregon courts' use of the statute to engage in a
critical assessment of foreign inheritance laws, by their very nature, had
produced "a direct impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely
affect the power of the central government to deal with those problems. 57
That the Oregon statute could be viewed as a minor and occasional
intrusion meant little. Quoting an earlier case which presaged the entrance
of Zschernig's full-blown DFAP doctrine, the Court stated, "[e]xperience
has shown that international controversies of the gravest moment, sometimes
even leading to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to another's
subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government. '58  Whether the United
States recognizes the anger incited by S.B. 839 as "real or imagined," the
only question, ultimately, is whether Vietnam perceives it as an insult of the
"gravest moment." 59
C. A State's Forbidden Impact on Foreign Relations Does Not Have to
Be Literally Expressed in the Offending Statute in Order to Violate the
DFAP Doctrine
The impact of a state statute on foreign affairs did not have to be
literally stated: if the application of that statute resulted in offending a
with the United States' conduct of foreign relations," the Court declared that "the Government's
acquiescence... certainly does not justify" upholding the reciprocity statute. Id.
53 Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 163 (2d ed. 1996).
4 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441.
5 Id. at 434-5.
56 Id (quotations omitted).
I d. at 441.
5 Id. at 441 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64).
59 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441.
JANUARY 2005
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
foreign nation, it could constitute a violation.60 The Oregon courts reviewed
in Zschernig, for example, had "launched inquiries into the type of
governments ... in foreign countries," 61 a fatal flaw that "led into minute
inquiries concerning the actual administration of foreign law, into the
credibility of foreign diplomatic statements, and into speculation whether
[the parties actually] received delivery of funds." 62 Specifically, those courts
had attacked the character and integrity of the Communist governments in
question.63
This level of political judgment and anti-socialist sentiment not only
echoes the legislative history behind S.B. 839, but also presages its dim
future. By mandating the symbolic recognition of a government that no
longer exists, and in the process incensing that country's current
government, the state of Louisiana has overstepped the bounds of the DFAP
doctrine set forth in Zschernig.
IV. S.B. 839 RAISES THE SAME CONCERNS AS DESCRIBED IN ZSCHERNIG
REGARDING ENCOURAGEMENT OF UNWANTED STATE ACTION
One of the main concerns in Zschernig appeared to be the Court's fear
64of encouraging similar insurgent actions on the part of the other states.
Repeated in lower court decisions since then,65 this "slippery slope"
argument aptly describes the pandemic aspect 66 of flag-based legislation
such as S.B. 839.
60 Id. at 442 (stating that "any realistic attempt to apply [the statute in question] ... would
necessarily involve the Oregon courts in an evaluation . .. of the administration of foreign law, the
credibility of foreign diplomatic statements, and the policies of foreign governments").
61 Id. at 434.
62 Id. at 435.
63 Id. at 437, n.8. The Court paid particular attention to the treatment of Communist recipients in
other states with similar reciprocity statutes, citing one Pennsylvania judge's declaration that "I am not
going to send money to Russia where it can go into making bullets which may one day be used against my
son." Id. A Montana probate court opined that if it allowed receivership, it would be "knowingly
contributing financial aid to a Communist monolithic satellite, fanatically dedicated to the abolishing of the
freedom and liberty of the citizens of this nation." Id. Although the Zschernig court did note one Oregon
decision that allowed the transfer of property to Poland, it observed that the probate judge had done so only
after "appraisal of the current attitude of Washington, D.C. toward Warsaw." Id. The Court thus concluded
that the Oregon statute "as construed seems to make unavoidable judicial criticism of nations established on
a more authoritarian basis than our own." Id.
64 Id. at 440.
6' N.Y. Times v. City of N.Y Human Rights Comm'n, 361 N.E.2d 963 (N.Y. 1977); Springfield
Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300 (Il1. Sup. Ct. 1986).
6 See Roster, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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A. A Statute's Provocation of Similar Legislation Indicates a Violation
of the DFAP Doctrine
In Zschernig, the Court characterized the rapid spread of reciprocity
laws targeting Communist countries as a "notorious" trend. It listed with
disapproval a long series of state court decisions similar to those decided by
68the probate courts in Oregon.
Over the years, lower courts have noted with similar concern the
infectious nature of state actions targeting such explosive international topics
as apartheid practices in South Africa,69 the Iran hostage crisis, 7° Holocaust
reparations,71 and American involvement in Vietnam.72 In N.Y. Times v.
City of N.Y Human Rights Comm'n, the New York Human Rights
Commission had attempted to prevent the New York Times' publication of
employment opportunities in apartheid South Africa.73 The New York Court
of Appeals described as "disastrous" the consequences of approving such a
measure: "The true danger is that if New York City could do this in one
instance, it could do so in many instances... [and] adopt its own foreign
policy."74 In Tayyari v. N.M. State Univ., the District Court of New Mexico
indicated the "commonplace" trend of "strong negative reactions" towards
Iran when it overturned a university's admissions policy forbidding entry to
students whose home country held or permitted the holding of U.S.
hostages. 75  The university, a public institution, had instituted the policy in
the wake of the 1980 Iran hostage crisis.76 The Illinois Supreme Court
seemed particularly concerned with the consequences of approving a
selectively high tax on South African kruggerands in Springfield Rare Coin
Galleries v. Johnson: "[T]he practical effect of [such selective taxation] is to
impose, or at least encourage, an economic boycott of the South African
krugerrand. ' 77 As noted earlier, a great number of cities have already passed
proclamations similar to the one in Louisiana, and a great many more
67 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440.
68 id.
69 N. Y. Times, 361 N.E.2d at 965; Springfield, 503 N.E.2d at 307.
70 Tayyari v. N.M. State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D.N.M. 1980).
7' Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003).
72 Silberman v. Katz, 283 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1967).
73 N.Y. Times, 361 N.E.2d at 963.
71 Id. at 969
75 Tayyari, 495 F. Supp. at 1376.
76 id.
77 Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1986).
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continue to do SO. 7 8 Seen in this context, S.B. 839 embodies the very type of
encouragement forbidden by the lower courts.
B. S.B. 839 Represents a Growing National Movement to Eradicate Use
of the Socialist Vietnamese Flag
S.B. 839 represents the power of momentum. As the twelfth piece of
flag legislation passed in recent years, it has joined a group of fifty-nine
cities and three other states denouncing use of the Socialist flag.79 These
laws are not the direct fruit of the Louisiana bill per se, but rather reflect the
persistence of the movement as a whole. As the first successful state law of
its kind, it represents the most visible benchmark and the most potent
evidence of the movement's growing influence.
At last count, sixty-two other localities across the country have passed
flag legislation declaring, in one form or another, their recognition of the
South Vietnamese flag.8 The most remarkable fact behind this figure is not
its size, but the rate at which it materialized. The first successful resolution
passed in the city of Westminster, California, on February 12, 2003, and in
little more than a year, similar resolutions have raced across almost every
single region of the United States. 81 This translates into roughly four cities
per month and includes major metropolitan hubs such as Boston,
Philadelphia, Honolulu, San Diego, and Houston. 82  The organizations
responsible for flag resolutions have ranged from student associations 83 to
civic groups,84 and even a group of parents at Anthony Lane Elementary
School in Fairfax, Virginia. 85 Thus far, no one has established a national
clearinghouse or unified coalition dedicated to the flag issue and no single
group has commandeered and guided the effort.
78 See Roster, supra note 3.
79 See id.
'0 See id.
"' See id.
82 See id.
83 See, e.g., Judy Gibbs Robinson, Vietnamese Politics Cause Flap Over Flag in Stillwater, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 2, 2003, at 4A (discussing efforts of the Vietnamese American Student Association at
Oklahoma State University); Activists Want South Vietnamese Flag Recognized, THE HOLLAND SENTINEL,
May 23, 2003 (noting influence of Vietnamese Student Association at San Jose State University), at
http://hollandsentinel.com/stories/052503/new 052503028.shtm (last visited Jan. 23, 2005).
8 Steven Ginsberg & William Branigin, Bid to Honor South Vietnamese Elicits Anger, Va. Bill to
Display Defeated Republic's Flag Called 'Insolent' by Ruling Government, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2003, at
B01 (discussing activism of Boat People SOS, a Vietnamese American civic group in Falls Church, VA).5 William Branigin & Phuong Ly, Vote on Vietnam Flag Ignites Deep Passions, Communist
Emblem Painful to Many, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2003, at B04.
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Both the United States and Vietnamese governments have pointed out
the potential or realized encouragement of similar action on the part of other
states. 86 Indeed, states and cities seem aware of this domino effect, reflected
by one city legislator's suggestion that "if [similar bills] are passed in
different communities, that will send the message to our government in
Washington., 87 Binh Nguyen, vice-president of the public affairs committee
for the Vietnamese-American Community in Houston, noted the trigger-
effect of Virginia's first attempt to pass a flag referendum: "[It] is further
evidence of Vietnamese-Americans' growing numbers and political
sophistication. They're starting to get to know more about how the system
works and they have people in the system.' 88  Newspaper coverage
described how the flag movement "ignited [in February 2002] in Virginia
and spread from city to city among a network of activists."
89
V. S.B. 839 IMPACTS FOREIGN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND VIETNAM IN VIOLATION OF THE DFAP DOCTRINE
Zschernig forbade state actions that impacted relations between the
United States and other countries. 90  Both the United States and the
Vietnamese Embassy have drawn attention to specific negotiations between
the United States and Vietnam that could potentially suffer because of the
flag legislation.91 The most prominent include the return of all POW/MIA
servicemen to the United States, the derailment of trade relations, and the
concern over human rights violations.
92
A. A State Statute Need Only Have "Some Incidental or Indirect
Effect ,93 in Foreign Countries to Violate the DFAP Doctrine
Although Zschernig offered little guidance beyond the phrase "some
incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries" to determine a violation of
86 See Mai Tran, Garden Grove Makes Choice in Vietnamese Flags: South Wins, the City Joins
Westminster in Refusing to Display the Communist Banner, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003, Pt. 2, at 9
[hereinafter Garden Grove].
87 id.
8' Activists Want South Vietnamese Flag Recognized, supra note 83.
89 Id.
90 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968).
9' See Vietnam Terms Virginia Bill on South Vietnamese Flag "'Unacceptable, " GLOBAL NEWS
WIRE, Feb. 10, 2003 [hereinafter Unacceptable]; Steven Ginsberg, Global Furor Dooms Vietnam Flag Bill,
Va. Panel Shelves Honor for Symbol of Fallen Republic, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at C06 [hereinafter
Global Furor].
92 See Ky Tran-Trong, supra note 11, at 1591-93.
93 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at433.
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the DFAP doctrine,94 lower courts have generally interpreted this key phrase
quite broadly.95 In NY. Times v. City of N. Y Comm 'n on Human Rights, 96
the state court of appeals characterized the city commission's charges of
discrimination against South Africa as a sufficient violation of the
"incidental or indirect effect" test. 97  There, the court stated that the
apartheid government of South Africa had been recognized as "the
legitimately constituted governmental authority for that country" and that "it
is beyond the province of the State courts, much less municipal agencies, to
sit in review of the laws of foreign governments." 98 The Springfield court,
while noting that the "line of demarcation between incidental and
unconstitutional intrusions into foreign affairs is difficult to draw with
absolute precision,"99 concluded that a compromise in the federal
government's "ability... to choose between a range of policy options in
developing its foreign policy"'00 with another country was enough to
constitute an incidental and indirect effect. Such a compromise occurred
simply "by the existence of State-sponsored sanctions which the Federal
government could not remove or modify to fit changing conditions." 101
B. S.B. 839 Impacts United States and State Interests
The opening of the Vietnamese border came at an arguably great cost:
the loss of key leverage in resolving the POW/MIA issue. Without the
proven clout of an economic embargo, the United States now has less room
to risk antagonizing Vietnam and losing further ground on the recovery of
nearly 2000 outstanding missing servicemen. One Pittsburgh newspaper
noted with concern that Vietnamese officials were still "cooperating
actively" with the United States in "making a full accounting of servicemen
listed as missing or killed in Indochina."' 10 2
The enticement of a new Asian market as consolation pales in the
harsh light of reality. Because Vietnam continues to struggle with the
94Id.
95 See N.Y. Times v. City ofN.Y Comm'n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963 (N.Y. 1977); Tayyari
v. N.M. State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D.N.M. 1980); Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.
2003); Silberman v. Katz, 283 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1967).
I N.Y Times, 361 N.E.2d at 963.
97 Id. at 968.
98 Id.
99 Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1986).
'Do Id.
101 Id.
102 See Red Flag: State Governments Shouldn 't Do Foreign Policy, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Feb.
24, 2003, at A-14 [hereinafter Red Flag].
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conversion of its socialist business practices to a market-friendly legal
system,10 3 the prospects for a successful new Asian market remains
uncertain. The United States' encouragement of mass reform in areas of
Vietnamese contract law and other steps towards a true market economy
may become more difficult as states and major cities insist on, in essence,
thumbing their nose at the current government. 1°4
On the other hand, if the new Asian market in Vietnam becomes a
thriving reality, states and municipalities such as Louisiana risk angering the
bearer of that market's fruits. In its official statement to the State
Department, the Vietnamese Embassy repeated its warnings of economic
repercussions, stating that Virginia's effort to raise the South Vietnamese
flag "has revived past animosities, and runs counter to the trend of
developing relations for mutual interests [sic] of the Vietnamese and U.S.
people, including the people of Virginia State."'105 Opponents of the bill in
the Virginia Chamber of Commerce expressed corresponding fears that "if
the bill passes, state businesses could be denied their long-awaited foray in
to Vietnamese markets [and that] Vietnamese trade would be diverted from
Virginia ports."'
06
Louisiana is in an already fractious economic position because of the
recent controversy surrounding the importation of Vietnamese catfish. 10 7 As
one of the four states most heavily dependent on the catfish industry,1
0 8
Louisiana benefited significantly from the drastically hiked tariffs on
Vietnamese catfish in 2003.19 Beginning a mere ten days after the bilateral
trade agreement was signed,"l0 the controversy spilled over into the very
inauguration of open trade between the two countries and left a bitter taste in
the mouths of the Vietnamese."' While the ongoing catfish controversy is
one of the most significant issues facing Louisiana today, for reasons of
103 Duc V. Trang, Eighteenth Annual International Law Symposium "Doing Business In Vietnam:
Law/Economy/Politics": The Practice ofLaw and Foreign Investment in Vietnam, 22 WHITTIER L. REV.
1067, 1070 (2001).
104 See Duc V. Trang, supra note 103.
105 See Unacceptable, supra note 91.
16 Mary Shaffrey, Virginia Bill Would Fly South Vietnam Flag, Its Inclusion Sought at Public
Events, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2003, at A01.
107 See Seth Mydans, Americans and Vietnamese Fighting over Catfish, N. Y. TIMES, November 5,
2002, at A-3.
108 Timothy R. Brown, Catfish Farmers Seek ReliefIn Petition, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL,
June 30, 2002 at DS12. See also Vietnam Catfish Spark Trade Duel, STATE-TIMES/MORNING ADVOCATE,
Oct. 6, 2001, at 12-B ("In Louisiana, there are more than 100 catfish farms, producing 67 million pounds of
catfish worth more than $47 million last year.").
'09 Tariffs Ordered on Cafish and Computer Chips, N. Y. TIMES, June 18, 2003, at C-4 (subjecting
Vietnamese catfish farmers to anti-dumping tariffs of 44.66 percent to 63.88 percent).
11o David Lamb, U.S., Vietnam in Dispute Over Cafish Exports, L. A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, at pt. 1, 5.
111 See Walton, supra note 9.
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space and economy this Comment will not elaborate on the details." 2 It is
sufficient to say that the sentiments of S.B. 839 certainly do not endear
Louisiana to the government of Vietnam. The political condemnation
presented by S.B. 839 can hardly do anything but exacerbate the situation.
1 3
Another consequence of these questionable state and city incursions
into foreign affairs could be the derailing of recent efforts by Congress to
address Vietnam's human rights violations.' 14 House Resolution 427, for
example, proposes to withhold aid to Vietnam until it demonstrates visible
progress toward religious and other human freedoms. 15  Nineteen out of
twenty-two of the bill's co-sponsors represent states with city referendums
against the socialist Vietnam flag.1 6 The consequence of this figure remains
uncertain. However, it is fair to say that the simultaneous criticism levied by
the House bill simply seems repetitive.
That is not to say that the fate of the United States-Vietnam
relationship lies exclusively in the hands of Vietnam. Although Vietnam's
economy reacted immediately and favorably to the institution of doi moi in
1986,1 17 its rate of economic growth through foreign investment has
plummeted and stagnated in the past decade." 8 The decline began in 1996,
with foreign direct investment eventually sliding below 1992 levels in 2000
and the gross domestic product taking an equal hit." 9 Foreign investors,
initially enthusiastic at the opportunity to enter the Vietnamese market, have
cut back dramatically in recent years.
120
The ultimate issue, then, is how much each country can tolerate in this
constantly-shifting balance of power between money and human rights
issues. Regardless of how this conflict eventually plays out, the matter most
importantly remains a federal one. The current panoply of state voices
behind the U.S. government can only serve to frustrate and confuse the
..2 For a more detailed discussion of the catfish controversy, see Walton, supra note 9.
113 One letter to the editor of the Birmingham News, entitled "Communist Catfish Have No Place
Here," echoes the complaints of the state courts in Zschernig, stating that "dollars paid for Vietnam catfish
go directly into the Communist Party treasury." Michael Deck, Letter to the Editor, BIRMINGHAM NEWS,
Mar. 7, 2001.
114 See H. Res. 427, 108th Congress, 1st Sess. (Oct. 30, 2003).
115 Id.
116 Id. Those nineteen co-sponsors are Rep. Davis R-VA, Rep. Lofgren D-CA, Rep. Royce R-CA,
Rep. Berman D-CA, Rep. Crowley D-NY, Rep. Delahunt D-MA, Rep. Green D-TX, Rep. Hoeffel D-PA;
Rep. Lantos D-CA, Rep. McNulty D-NY, Rep. Napolitano D-CA, Rep. Rohrabacher, Rep. Ros-Lehtinen
R-FL, R-CA, Rep. Schiff D-CA, Rep. Watson D-CA, Rep. Wexler D-FL, Rep. Bell D-TX, Rep. Culberson
R-TX, Rep. Solis D-CA.
:1 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
I8 See Duc V. Trang, supra note 103.
119 GDP growth has dropped from approximately eight percent in the early 1990s, to two to four
percent in recent years. See id.
120 See id.
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rehabilitation process. Here, without "one voice," the United States risks
losing opportunities to make improvements at both humanitarian and
economic levels.
C. The Vietnamese Embassy Has Protested Flag Legislation and the
United States Has Responded by Condemning Those State Actions
Protests on the part of the Vietnamese embassy and the U.S. State
Department have been both swift and forceful. 121 The embassy has lodged
at least two successful complaints against a city (San Francisco) and state
(Virginia) for their ordinances mandating state recognition of the South
Vietnamese flag. 22 After the introduction of a flag-based bill in the 2003
session of the Virginia General Assembly, Secretary of State Colin Powell
sent a letter to the Vietnamese Foreign Minister detailing his opposition to
the bill "on the grounds that it would usurp the federal government's power
to make foreign policy.'' 123  Deputy U.S. Secretary of State Richard
Armitage also warned the General Assembly that H.B. 2829 could have
"potentially serious adverse consequences" on the effectiveness of United
States foreign policy, adding that it might encourage other "aggrieved ethnic
groups" to produce similar legislation. 24 Abroad, the U.S. Ambassador in
Hanoi emphasized that "the United States has formally recognized the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam and its flag is on public display along with
other nations with which we have diplomatic relations."' 25 State Department
spokesman Lou Fintor also cited the exclusive foreign relations power of the
president in Article II of the Constitution to demonstrate the impropriety of
Virginia's action. 126
The Vietnamese Embassy in Washington also reacted angrily to H.B.
2829, demanding that the General Assembly "kill it.' 27 The Washington
Post reported that the State Department contacted Virginia state legislators
"almost immediately after the [General Assembly] vote to express concern
:21 See Unacceptable, supra note 91; Global Furor, supra note 91.
z2 See Patrick Hoge, Protesters See Red Over S.F. Flag Veto, South Vietnam's Banner Unlikely to
Fly, S. F. CHRONICLE, July 29, 2003, at A13 (describing San Francisco's withdrawal of its resolution after
protest from the Vietnamese consulate in San Francisco); Vietnam Objects to Virginia's Lower House
Allowing Former Saigon Govt. Flag, VIETNAM. NEWS BRIEFS, Feb. 10, 2003 (describing the Vietnamese
embassy's issuance of protest shortly before the demise of the Virginia bill).
12 Ben Stocking, Virginia Seeks to Ban Flying of Vietnam Flag, Powell Says Measure Usurps US.
Power to Set Foreign Policy, THE RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Feb. 17, 2003, at A07.
124 See Red Flag, supra note 102.
:25 See Stocking, supra note 123.
126 See Shaffrey, supra note 106.
127 Global Furor, supra note 91.
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about constitutional issues and fear that the action could cause an
international rift." 128 Vietnam's most politically powerful newspaper termed
the possible passage of H.B. 2829 "the most bizarre act in the history of the
United States. 1 29  Finally, the Vietnamese Embassy issued an official
statement stating its emphatic disapproval of the bill:
The approval of the Bill by the Virginian House of
Representatives is diametrically opposed to the Constitution of
the United States of America, disregarding international
standards and it is absolutely unacceptable in the relationship
between nations having official diplomatic ties... Vietnam
strongly protests against the bill and requires the US
government, the US Congress, and the governor and the
legislature of Virginia State to take timely measures to cancel
this erroneous bill.
130
These protests have had some effect. Pressured by the State
Department, the Virginia General Assembly effectively extinguished that
state's first attempt in 2003.131 The second version, which passed in April
2004, toned down its language markedly, pushing aside all mention of
Communism and substituting a more benign statement recognizing the "flag
with three red stripes" as a "heritage" flag.
132
The Embassy's reaction to the actions of Westminster and Garden
Grove, California, deserves special attention. These two cities sit side by
side in Orange County, home to the highest concentration of Vietnamese
people outside of Vietnam.' 33 In a letter to Governor Gray Davis, Vietnam
Consul General Nguyen Manh Hung stated that the two cities' "actions are
unacceptable and strongly rejected by the Vietnamese people," labeling the
referendum's two most vocal supporters "overseas extremists."' 34 Consul
General Nguyen stated plainly in his letter to Governor Davis that the
128 Steven Ginsberg & William Branigin, Bid to Honor South Vietnamese Elicits Anger: Va. Bill to
Display Defeated Republic's Flag Called 'Insolen " by Ruling Government, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2003, at
Bol.29 Politics & Law: Vietnam Objects To Virginia's Lower House Allowing Former Saigon Gov't
Flag, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE, Feb. 10, 2003, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, All News File.
130 Unacceptable, supra note 91.
131 Global Furor, supra note 91.
132 H.R. 1475, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003), available at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp504.exe?041+sum+HB1475 (last visited Jan. 23, 2005).
Mai Tran, Vietnam Criticizes 3 OC. Officials for Pushing Rival Flag, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2003,
pt.2, at 5 [hereinafter 3 O.C. Officials].
134 Id.
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Orange County resolutions "run counter to the development of the
relationship for mutual interest of the Vietnamese and United States."' 35 In
another letter to Governor Davis, Nguyen Tam Chien, Vietnam's
Ambassador to the United States, made clear that "the [Orange County]
resolutions... will only serve to revive the past of hatred... and damage
the potential relationship of mutual benefit between our two countries and
between Vietnam and your state."'136 The fact that Ambassador Nguyen
referred not only to the relationship between the two countries, but to the
tension between Vietnam and the individual states, implicates the degree to
which these relationships hang in jeopardy as a direct consequence of the
proclamations.
Even the cities that have successfully passed such legislation have not
done so without considerable protest from within their own communities.
Mayor Willie Brown vetoed San Francisco's flag referendum within two
weeks of its favorable vote by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors.'
37
Pressured by the State Department and the Vietnamese Consul General in
San Francisco, the Board did not object. 138  It instead claimed it had
misunderstood the referendum's language, thinking that it had proposed
recognition of the current flag of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.'
39
Following the flap, Board President Matt Gonzalez stated, "[r]ecognizing a
country's flag ... gets you dangerously close to foreign policy, something
that I don't think a municipal legislature should be doing."'
140
In sum, it is clear that the Vietnamese government is aware of and
strongly disapproves the message behind flag-based legislation such as S.B.
839. In addition, the federal government has responded to these concerns,
dismissing arguments that the statutes are not impacting foreign relations.
VI. S.B. 839's LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY INDICATE AN
INTENT TO AFFECT FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THEREFORE A VIOLATION OF
THE DFAP DOCTRINE.
Both the Zschernig Court and other courts have scrutinized, as a
question of fact, the veracity of a state or city's claim of political neutrality
135 id.
136 Mai Tran & Scott Martelle, Vietnam 's Flag Raises Hackles, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, pt. 2, at
1 [hereinafter Hackles].
137 See Hoge, supra note 122.
138 See id.
139 See id.
'4 See id.; Janine DaFeo, South Vietnam Flag Won't Fly in Oakland: Brown Removes Controversial
Topic from Council Agenda, S.F. CHRON., June 4, 2003, A20 (reporting how one Oakland Councilmember
stated that "it's an international issue I don't believe the city needs to get in the middle of').
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or non-interference. 14' S.B. 839 fails under such scrutiny because its very
language describes hostility against the current Vietnamese government,
142
and its birth was attended by open condemnations of Communism.1
43
A. A Statute Can Violate the DFAP Doctrine Either Facially or Through
Practical Application
In Zschernig, the Court found that even though the statute in question
did not facially dictate an intent to affect foreign affairs, "as construed [it]
seems to make unavoidable judicial criticism of nations established on a
more authoritarian basis than our own."'144
Other courts have summarily judged the true intent of state laws by
examining the political and social context under which they were passed. In
Tayyari, the Court pointedly questioned the Regents' argument that they did
not "intend to enter the area of... foreign policy," ultimately finding that
the "Regents' true purpose in enacting the ... motion was to make a
political statement."' 1 5 Similarly, when upholding a city clerk's refusal to
place a referendum the New York City ballot for "Anti-Vietnam War
Coordinator," the Silberman Court declared that the "obvious intent" of the
citizen-petitioners was to take "a public opinion poll."' 46 The petitioners
themselves conceded that the City of New York was powerless "to
effectuate the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam" and as such could not
even create such a position.147 The Court in N.Y. Times also undercut the
Commission on Human Rights' accusations of discriminatory behavior at
the New York Times when it concluded that "the reality is that complainants
seek to impose an economic boycott aimed at the present government of the
Republic of South Africa.', 148  Most recently, the Court in Springfield
declared it "undisputed" that "the purposes of [Illinois' targeted taxation of
141 Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968); Tayyari v. N.M. State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365,
1376 (D.N.M. 1980); Silberman v. Katz, 283 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901 (1967).
142 The language states, "recogniz[ing]... [Vietnamese who] were valiant in their resistance to the
aggression of the communist North Vietnam." S.B 839, codified as LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:153.3
(2004).
143 See Senate Hearing on S.B. 839, 2003 Sen., 2003 Reg. Sess. (La. 2003) [hereinafter Sen. Hearing]
(statements of Sen. Jon Johnson, Sen. Robert J. Barham, Sen. J. Chris Ullo, Members, Committee on
Senate and Gov't Affairs); Legislative Hearing on S.B. 839, 2003 Leg., 2003 Reg. Sess. (La. 2003)
[hereinafter Leg. Hearing] (statements of Rep. Edwin R. Murray, Rep. Loulan Pitrie, Jr., Members, Comm.
on House and Gov't Affairs).
14 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440.
"'t Tayyari, 495 F. Supp. at 1376.
146 Silberman, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
141 Id. at 900.
148 N.Y. Times v. City of N.Y Human Rights Comm'n, 361 N.E.2d 963, 967 (N.Y. 1977).
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the South African kruggerand] are to express disapproval of South Africa
and to discourage investment in its products.' 49 In rejecting the California
statute in Deutsch, Judge Reinhardt concluded that the statute was "a remedy
for wartime acts that California's legislature believed had never been fairly
resolved."150
B. The Language of S.B. 839 Explicitly Protests the Communist Regime
in Vietnam
The text of S.B. 839 reveals an intent to express the community's
feelings against Communism.' 51 Whether that anti-Communist animus
originated in state legislators themselves or in their constituency of
Vietnamese-Americans, the motive itself is undeniable. Despite claims by
the bill's proponents that they merely want the South Vietnamese flag to
represent the Vietnamese in Louisiana, the statutory language of S.B. 839
itself clearly indicates otherwise, honoring all Vietnamese who were "valiant
in their resistance to the aggression of Communist North Vietnam."'' 52 The
text of S.B. 839 indicates a purpose of celebrating the ideals of democracy
over Communism, referring to a particular country that no longer exists and
whose battlefield has already been drawn and lost. It purports to "honor"
this past over the reality, however difficult, of the present.
Indicating their similar awareness of the federalism issues presented
by flag legislation, several cities have tailored their language to reflect a
more defensible "community-based" position. The city of Falls Church,
Virginia, for example, deleted certain language at the advice of its attorney,
which would have required flying the South Vietnamese flag at official
government events and city locations. 53 However, the Falls Church bill
continues to designate the South Vietnamese flag "the official flag of the
Vietnamese-American community in the United States."' 54  Boston also
addressed the issue by "confining [its] resolution to Boston's Vietnamese-
American community [to] keep it within City Council rules prohibiting
motions that do not have 'a direct bearing on the business of the council.""'155
San Jose followed suit, changing its language to allow the flag to be flown at
'49 Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 305 (I11. Sup. Ct. 1986).
5so Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 712 (9th Cir. 2003).
151 See Sen. Hearing, supra note 143; Leg. Hearing, supra note 143.
152 S.B. 839, supra note 1.
153 Flag of South Vietnam Okd to Fly at Eden Shopping Center, FALLS CHURCH NEWS-PRESS, Apr.
17, 2003.
"4 See id.
55 Yvonne Abraham, A Fight for Viet Flag: For Immigrants, Old Banner is a Rallying Point,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 13, 2003, at BI.
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city events, but refraining from declaring it the official flag of the
Vietnamese community or banning the Republic of Vietnam's flag
entirely.
56
These instances of careful drafting demonstrate municipal bodies'
understanding of the federalism issues at stake. The adoption of S.B. 839,
therefore, presents the most immediate danger to hobbled relations with
Vietnam. Of the sixty-three localities that have adopted flag-based
resolutions, S.B. 839 remains the first successful state bill to use vigorous
anti-Communist language and forbid the flying of the actual Socialist flag.' 57
C. The Legislative History of S.B. 839 Reveals a Desire to Oppose the
Current Regime in Vietnam
The legislative history of S.B. 839 also reveals a bill primarily
focused on protesting the current Communist government of Vietnam.' 58 At
the meeting of the Committee on Senate and Government Affairs on April
30, 2003, Senator Jon Johnson (D-Orleans) stressed the Vietnamese-
American community's "very strong feelings. -. about Communism and the
condition [of] their country" before introducing the bill. 59 He characterized
that community's support of S.B. 839 as an effort "to assist in promoting a
democracy in the Republic of Vietnam."
60
Before reporting the bill favorably to the House, the Senate deferred
to various members of the Vietnamese American Community of Louisiana
(VACL), a local organization that served as the engine behind the flag
legislation.161 Cindy Nguyen, VACL's external affairs assistant, compared
her community's desire for a South Vietnamese flag to that of well-known
community groups such as the Girl Scouts and the local 4-H club, who have
a flag "to represent their interests.' 62 John Nguyen, the group's Internal
Affairs Assistant, identified the visible separation between the ideologies of
Vietnamese-Americans and native Vietnamese as one of those interests:
"[T]he [expatriate] Vietnamese believe ... freedom, especially the freedom
156 DaFeo, supra note 140.
157 S.B. 839, supra note 1.
158 See Sen. Hearing, supra note 143; Leg. Hearing, supra note 143.
159 See Sen. Hearing, supra note 143 ("The bill is designed to allow the Vietnamese community to
recognize the former flag of the Republic of Vietnam before it fell into Communist hands").
'6' See id.
161 See id.
162 See id. (statement of Cindy Nguyen, External Affairs Assistant, Vietnamese-American
Community of Louisiana).
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of speech and the freedom of religion, [to be] the basic rights of a person.
' 63
He denied that the flag issue would interfere with foreign relations and asked
the Senate "to recognize this flag to be the flag of the Vietnamese-
Americans who are living in Louisiana."
'1 64
The Senate reacted extremely favorably to this testimony. Senators
Robert J. Barham (R-Ouachita) and J. Chris Ullo (D-Jefferson), both
Vietnam War veterans, noted the great work ethic and significant economic
force of the Vietnamese-American community, which in recent years has
taken over and revitalized the fishing industry in this impoverished 
state. 165
Together with Senators Johnson and Ullo, Senator Barham then pledged his
support in honor of "what [the Vietnamese have] been through, [their]
resilience and [their] courage." 
166
The Senate did not mention the bill's possible interference in the
realm of foreign affairs. The House, however, expressed some initial
concern regarding this matter before ultimately reporting favorably on the
bill. 167  Representative Loulan J. Pitre, Jr. (R-Jefferson), warned that
although he "agree[d] in substance with everything in the resolution
personally," he reserved "some caution about [the] state legislature doing
anything that would undermine U.S. foreign policy or represent any
attempt... [to conduct] foreign policy.' 6 The bill's House sponsor, Rep.
Edwin R. Murray (D-96th District), simply responded, "I am not conducting
U.S. Foreign policy and I can assure you that this bill doesn't either."'
169
Louisiana, along with other states and municipalities, has insisted that
its purpose in enacting flag-based legislation centers on enhancing
community pride and denies that its actions will affect foreign policy. 
170
However insistent these claims may be, the reality remains that: (1) the
statutory language and transcripts of committee hearings directly contradict
those assurances, and (2) regardless of whether one can ferret out the "true
intent" of legislators, their actions have caused effects in foreign relations
between the two countries.
163 See id. (statement of John Huang Nguyen, Internal Affairs Assistant, Vietnamese-American
Community of Louisiana).
'6 See id.
161 See id.
166 See id.
167 See Leg. Hearing, supra note 143.
161 See id.
169 See id.
170 See id.
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VII. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROTECT LEGISLATION REQUIRING
THE USE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FLAG
S.B. 839 cannot pose as protected speech and thus escape scrutiny
under the DFAP doctrine because it is government expression not addressed
by the First Amendment.1 71  The majority of cases invoking the DFAP
doctrine have centered on cases with a direct impact on the economy or a
tangible effect on a quantifiable liberty interest (i.e., denial of higher
education).17 2 But courts have also spoken definitively on more symbolic
incursions into foreign affairs. Lest it be asserted that a controversy over a
flag could not possibly merit serious consequences, one need only recall the
Supreme Court's statement in Hines v. Davidowitz: "Experience has shown
that international controversies of the gravest moment, sometimes even
leading to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to another's subjects
inflicted, or permitted, by a government."' 173
A. Government Speech is Not Protected by the First Amendment Under
CBS v. Democratic National Committee
The Supreme Court has spoken only once on the issue of First
Amendment protection of government speech, when adjudicating the
Democratic National Committee's claim of political favoritism on network
television in CBS v. Democratic National Committee. 74  Justice Stewart
stated in his concurrence that "[t]he First Amendment protects the press
from governmental interference; it confers no analogous protection on the
Government.' '175  The lower courts have without exception followed this
sole source of guidance, although several have characterized a somewhat
qualified protection of government speech as an "open question."'176
Regardless of these disagreements, the lower courts have continued to
171 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances").
:72 Tayyari v. N.M. State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D.N.M. 1980).73 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941).
174 id.
171 Id. at 139.
176 See Muir v. Alabama Education Television Commission, 688 F.2d 1033, 1038 (5th Cir. 1980)
(deeming "essentially correct" the tenet that First Amendment protection "extends only to private
expression and not to governmental expression," but that the "government is not prohibited from
speaking."); American Library Association, Inc., v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, n.36 (E.D. Penn.)
(2002) (stating that "the question whether public entities are ever protected by the First Amendment ...
remains open."); Creek v. Village of Westhaven, 80 F.3d 186, 193 (7th Cir.) (1996) (designating the issue
of a municipality's First Amendment rights "a question we need not decide").
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adhere to the CBS decision. 177  Thus, the possibility of First Amendment
protection of government speech remains dim.
The government evinces forbidden "government speech" when it
confers the use of a public forum to one interest group whose philosophy it
approves, but denies it to a different group with whose message it
disagrees.178  The Court in NAACP v. Hunt,'79 for example, stated that
concern over such forbidden government speech "is especially important
when the government's dedication of a forum suppresses controversial or
political speech."' 80 The Hunt court paved the way for the placement of a
Confederate flag on the Alabama state dome when it denied that the dome
was "public property, which 'by tradition or designation is a forum for
public communication."" 8' The Hunt court eventually concluded that
Alabama could reserve the dome for communicative purposes as long as its
reservation was "reasonable and.., not an effort to suppress expression
because the public officials oppose the speaker's view."'' 2  At least one
other court has concluded, however, that municipal auditoriums, high school
auditoriums, and public libraries qualify as public forums.'8 3 Furthermore,
the Hunt court did not mandate the use of the Confederate flag in all public
schools or properties to represent the current United States. S.B. 839's
mandated use of a particular flag on all public property and institutions of
public education, therefore, constitutes a form of government speech.
B. Flags Constitute Government Speech
A flag is the self-determined symbol of a nation and thus its adoption
represents a core concept of sovereignty. 184 The Supreme Court has spokenon the powerful nature of a flag as a symbol, be it the American flag or the
'7 See Warner Cable Communications, Inc. v. City of Niceville, 911 F.2d 634, 638 (1 1th Cir. 1990)
("[A] government .. speaker is not itself protected by the first amendment."); NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d
1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1990) ("The First Amendment protects citizens' speech only from government
regulation; government speech itself is not protected by the First Amendment."); Student Gov't Ass'n v.
Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 481 (1st Cir. 1989) (concluding that the legal services
organization run by a state university, "as a state entity, itself has no First Amendment rights"); Estiverne v.
La. State Bar Ass'n, 863 F.2d 371, 379 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that "the First Amendment does not protect
government speech").
... Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
9 Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1555.
ISO Id. at 1566
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Muir v. Alabama Education Television Commission, 688 F.2d 1033, 1042 (5th Cir. 1980).
184 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989) ("Pregnant with expressive content, the flag as readily
signifies this Nation as does the combination of letters found in 'America."). See also United States. v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 316 n.6 (1990) ("[T]he flag is emblematic of the Nation as a sovereign entity").
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flag of another country.I15 More significantly, the Court has stressed the flag
not only as a static symbol, but also as a conduit for communication.186 In
Texas v. Johnson, the Court unequivocally stated that a flag's primary
purpose serves to communicate the endorsement of a particular group's
ideals:
That we have had little difficulty identifying an expressive
element in conduct relating to flags should not be surprising.
The very purpose of a national flag is to serve as a symbol of
our country; it is, one might say, "the one visible manifestation
of two hundred years of nationhood."'
8 7
In characterizing the flag as a "shortcut from mind to mind" in West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,'88 the Court established the
principle that the government can send messages through its adoption of
certain symbols.'89 In later years, this principle has expanded to include
religious displays on public property.190 Lower courts have followed suit,
asserting in one case that "[i]t seems clear that a flag flown on the state
capitol dome is flown under state authority."' 191
Recent controversy over the use of the Confederate flag on state
buildings highlights the extremely volatile nature of flags as communicative
symbols.192  In the past decade, four states have flown variants of the
Confederate flag over state buildings: Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina,
and Mississippi. 193 All four have faced a barrage of lawsuits, boycotts, and
public ire. 194 At the heart of each attack lay the contextual background in
which those states first adopted the Confederate flag. 195
Governor George Wallace of Alabama, who surrounded the
Birmingham public schools with National Guardsmen to prevent integration
15 Id.
186 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 600 (1989) (finding that permitting a religious
display in the county courthouse "sends an unmistakable message that [the government] supports and
promotes [Christianity]"); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).
187 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 603 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
... Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624.
59 Id. at 632.
:90 See County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 600
191 NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1562 ( lth Cir. 1990).
192 See James Forman, Jr., Note, Driving Dixie Down: Removing the Confederate Flag from Southern
State Capitols, 101 YALE L.J. 505 (1991); Beattie I. Butler, Muzzling Leviathan: Limiting State Powers of
Speech and Expression, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 153 (1996).
193 See Forman, supra note 192, at 507-09.
194 See id.
'95 See id.; Butler, supra note 192.
VOL. 14 No. I
LETTING BA YOUS BE BYGONES
in the early 1960's, 196 first raised the Confederate flag above the Alabama
state dome during his "Segregation Forever" campaign in 1963."' It stayed
there as a means of protesting desegregation. 98 South Carolina, the first
state to secede from the Union prior to the Civil War,' 99 and the only other
state to have flown the actual Confederate flag above its state dome, first
raised it in 1962.200
Mississippi adopted its flag design during the desegregationist effort
and has since required the flag to be displayed on public buildings, including
schools. 20' The flag, while not an actual Confederate flag, carries the
traditional Confederate symbol of the St. Andrew's cross prominently on its
face.202 The St. Andrew's cross also covered two-thirds of Georgia's state
flag, in lock-step with Governor Marvin Griffin's public oath against
segregation in 1956.203
Today, all states except one have succumbed to public pressure and
removed their Confederate flags.20 4 After an economic boycott by the
NAACP, South Carolina finally capitulated and removed the flag from its
state dome in 2001 .205 Facing mounting public pressure despite having
survived an Equal Protection discrimination suit in federal court,2 0 6 Alabama
also removed the Confederate flag in 1993.7 Although the Eleventh Circuit
sustained Alabama's right to fly the flag, a state judge later ruled that
Alabama law actually prohibited any flags except the national and state flags
208
to fly from the state dome.
After pressure from both its governor20 9 and the Eleventh Circuit,
Georgia re-designed its state flag in 2001 to include a much smaller emblem
of the St. Andrew's cross and to be used in conjunction with five other
19 See Forman, supra note 192, at 508.
9 See id. at 505.
9 See id. at 508.
199 Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment Approach
75 TEMPLE L. REv. 539, 584 (2002).
200 See Forman, supra note 192, at 506.
201 See Tsesis, supra note 199.
202 See id.
203 See id. at 604-5.
204 Mississippi voted to retain the Confederate symbol in its flag in 2001. See Forman, supra note
192, at 602.
205 Heather Hoope, Shakeup in the South Carolina Senate, STATE LEGISLATURES, Jul. 1, 1991, at 11.
206 NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990).
207 See Tsesis, supra note 192, at 605.
208 Confederate Flag is Pulled From Capitol, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1993, at A25.
209 At his 1991 State of the State address, Georgia Governor Zell Miller spent more than one-third of
his hour-long speech denouncing the use of the Confederate symbol in the state flag. All Things
Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 12, 1993) ("The current Georgia flag was adopted by a state
Legislature in 1956 that wanted to show scorn for integration being mandated by the federal government
and courts.").
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banners.2 10 The Georgian flag had narrowly survived an Equal Protection
suit in Coleman v. Miller.211 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit's earlier decision
in NAACP v. Hunt, which dismissed the Equal Protection attack against the
Alabama flag because "[c]itizens of all races are offended by its position," 212
the Coleman panel struggled against the Hunt rationale, dismissing it as
mere dicta.21 3 It eventually felt compelled to follow it nonetheless:
[B]ecause the Confederate battle flag emblem offends many
Georgians, it has, in our view, no place in the official state flag.
We regret that the Georgia legislature has chosen, and continues
to display, as an official state symbol a battle flag emblem that
divides rather than unifies the citizens of Georgia. As judges,
however, we are entrusted only to examine the controversies
and facts put before us. 2
14
C. The Raising of the South Vietnamese Flag is a Communicative Act by
a State Government and Thus Not Protected by the First Amendment
Flag-based legislation escapes a free-speech analysis because of its
application to and sole focus on public property. S.B. 839 actually codifies
the raising of a particular flag, whereas the states of Alabama and South
Carolina simply did so by custom. A public school or city office in
Lousiana, for example, may not opt out of using the South Vietnamese flag
when referring to the country of Vietnam.2 15 While S.B. 839 may not
mandate the use of the South Vietnamese flag in international diplomatic
functions, it raises a dangerous precedent nonetheless by allowing states or
cities to choose which political symbol its citizens may recognize. The real
injury occurs because of its placement above state building-including
schools, municipal auditoriums, and city halls-all recognized by at least
one circuit as public fora.2t 6 In a succinct observation, one newspaper in
Quincy, Massachusetts, stated that "[t]he crux of the controversy seems to
center on raising a flag of a foreign country-which isn't a country
anymore-on city property. ,217
210 See Tsesis, supra note 192, at 604-5.
211 Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 528 (1Ith Cir. 1997).
.2 NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1990).
213 Coleman, 117 F. 3d at 530 n.7.
114 Id. at 530.
211 S.B.839 2003, Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2003) (enacted).
216 Muir v. Alabama Education Television Commission, 688 F.2d 1033, 1042 (5th Cir. 1980).
217 Christopher Walker, Poles Apart: S. Vietnamese Flag Raising a Divisive Issue, THE PATRIOT
LEDGER (Qunicy, MA), Oct. 18, 2003, at 1.
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The communicative nature of the South Vietnamese flag can hardly be
denied. Alternatively hailed as a symbol, a show of support, and an act of
defiance, the flag has become a protean medium of expression. 218 Garden
Grove Councilman Mark Rosen added that his city's use of the flag "could
send a loud message to the people of Vietnam, as well as to U.S. officials,"
announcing to a large crowd of constituents that "if we continue to wave the
South Vietnam flag, we will help bring down the Communists in
Vietnam., 219 A Westminster city council member stressed that "it's not as
much as what it will do, but more importantly, what message it conveys.'
220
In explaining their reasons for lobbying against the Socialist flag on their
campus, South Puget Sound Community College students stated: "We
cannot let the Vietnamese citizens, who are still fighting and hoping for
freedom and democracy, lose their last hopes. 221 City Councilman Dave
Jones of Sacramento affirmed that the city's "issuance of this resolution
reflects our community support for the aspirations of the Vietnamese
community for freedom and democracy.,
222
Perhaps Vietnamese diplomat Vu Khoan put it most succinctly on a
recent visit to Washington, D.C. Vu, the most senior Vietnamese diplomat
to set foot in America since the Vietnam War, met with Secretary of State
Colin Powell in December 2003 to discuss the recent passage of the Vietnam
Human Rights Act in the House of Representatives and various trade
223issues. In regards to the recent rash of flag legislation, Vu stated:
While America has relations with one country, they recognize the flag
of another regime that is not in existence anymore. Imagine how you
would feel if another country did not recognize the Stars and Stripes
224but only the Confederate flag.
VIII. CONCLUSION
S.B. 839 violates the DFAP doctrine because of its intent to affect
foreign policy, its actual impact on such foreign policy, and its status as
unprotected government speech. Its validity, therefore, stands in serious
question.
2:1 See, e.g., Garden Grove, supra note 86.
219 See id.
220 See Tran & Martelle, supra note 136.
221 Compromise Has Merit on Flag Issue, THE OLYMPIAN, Nov. 14, 2003, at 9A.
222 Jocelyn Wiener, Savoring Liberty and Historic Flag, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 21, 2003, at B 1.
223 David W. Jones, Stable Relations Sought with U.S., WASH. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2003, at A06.
224 See id.
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That the displaced Vietnamese have endured tremendous loss over the
years is not in dispute. Their passion and anger are real, and the evidence of
their suffering cannot be denied. It may take years for the repercussions of
the Vietnam War to fade and its victims to find peace. However, this
Comment indicates the improvidence of this particular medium of protest.
Should the Vietnamese choose to further their cause, they risk losing
credibility as a group by persistently pursuing the wrong avenue.
The fact remains that the purpose behind S.B. 839 and its sister
legislation lies within the great political animosity harbored by the
Vietnamese-American community. While this Comment does not challenge
the reasons for this animosity, its role as the animus in the flag controversy
remains. Even without conceding the true purpose of resolutions such as
S.B. 839, the reactions of the federal and Vietnamese government indicate
that they have already impacted relations between the two countries.
The Vietnamese-American community has established through its
power as a political force through this exercise of flag-based legislation. As
citizens, the Vietnamese-American community can stand proud that their
voices have been heard. As arbiters of change, however, they will face more
palpable returns and less discouragement by using the proper channels of
protest in this federal system. The United States legislature, while arguably
slower and less responsive than city government structure, also represents
the single most influential voice in the foreign affairs arena. The federal
government's clout has allowed Vietnam to receive world aid and bestowed
its leaders with more of a voice themselves in the international community.
Joining the other lobbies in Washington may result in less immediate
gratification. By utilizing the obligations of Congress and the President,
though, the Vietnamese-American comnmmity may finally be able to harness
the necessary power for lasting change.
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